Q&A with FRA Chief Safety Officer Karl Alexy
8/17/2023
By Julie Sneider, Senior Associate Editor
A series of crude-oil train derailments in 2013 and 2014 in the United States and Canada — the deadly July 2013 disaster in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, the worst of all — prompted a slew of new regulations and safety recommendations from government entities in both countries. Those incidents included:
• July 6, 2013, Lac-Megantic, Quebec: Operated by Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway, an unattended, parked train began rolling downhill reaching a speed of 65 mph and derailing 63 tank cars carrying crude oil, causing an explosion and fire that destroyed half of the downtown area's buildings and killed 47 people. The accident remains the worst freight-rail disaster in Canada’s history.
• Nov. 7, 2013, Aliceville, Alabama: A 90-car train carrying crude oil and operated by Alabama & Gulf Coast Railway LLC jumped the track, causing 20 cars and two of three locomotives to derail; 11 of the derailed cars caught fire. No injuries were reported but 720,000 gallons of crude oil spilled.
• Dec. 30, 2013, Casselton, North Dakota: A BNSF train carrying crude oil collided with a previously derailed grain train. Oil spilled from 18 of the 20 derailed DOT-111 tank cars, formed pools and caught fire. Other derailed tank cars eventually ruptured as heat from the fire weakened the tank steel and increased the internal pressure until oil vapor erupted into fire balls.
On Dec. 30, 2013, in Casselton, North Dakota, a BNSF Railway train carrying crude oil collided with a previously derailed grain train. Oil spilled from 18 of the 20 derailed DOT-111 tank cars, formed pools and caught fire. National Transportation Safety Board • Jan. 7, 2014, Plaster Rock, New Brunswick: 19 cars and one locomotive on a 122-car CN train derailed, including five tank cars carrying crude oil and four cars carrying propane. About 61,000 gallons spilled from the tank cars and caught fire.
• Jan. 31, 2014, New Augusta, Mississippi: 19 rail cars on a CN train derailed, spilling up to 50,000 gallons of crude oil.
• April 30, 2014, Lynchburg, Virginia: 17 tank cars derailed on a CSX crude-oil unit train. One was breached and released about 29,868 gallons of crude oil into the James River, some of which caught fire.
When the Lac-Megantic rail disaster happened, Karl Alexy was staff director of the Federal Railroad Administration’s Hazardous Materials Division, a position he held starting in 2012. In coordination with the U.S. Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA), Alexy led efforts to develop the regulation on enhanced tank car standards and operational controls for high-hazard flammable trains.
Since 2019, Alexy has been the FRA’s associate administrator for railroad safety and chief safety officer. In his current role, he manages FRA’s regulatory oversight of rail safety in the United States and oversees the development and enforcement of regulations and safety programs for both freight and passenger rail.
Alexy’s been with the FRA since 2009, when he joined the hazmat division as a general engineer. His tenure also includes a stint as FRA’s deputy associate administrator for railroad safety supervising the Office of Safety Analysis, the Office of Technical Oversight and the Office of Regional Operations.
Last month, in recognition of the 10th anniversary of the Lac-Megantic derailment, Alexy answered questions from RailPrime about what the tragedy — and other crude-oil-related train derailments that occurred around that time — did to spur regulators’ and the rail industry’s reactions.
Among the regs implemented was a new safety rule governing the transportation of flammable liquids by rail, primarily crude and ethanol. In May 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation and Transport Canada held a joint press conference to unveil a new class of tank car for flammable liquids. Developed by the USDOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and Canada. The final rule — which predominantly applied to high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs) — was designed to prevent crude-by-rail accidents, mitigate consequences if an accident occurs and support emergency response efforts. Alexy was involved in the rule’s development.
RailPrime also asked Alexy to compare the U.S. public reactions to the Lac-Megantic derailment with the public reaction to the hazmat train derailment that occurred earlier this year in East Palestine, Ohio. Below are his responses, some of which have been edited for length and context.
RailPrime What do you remember about the first few hours and days after Lac-Megantic occurred? How did you find out about it?
Alexy: As staff director of the Hazardous Materials Division, I was right in the teeth of it. I’m trying to remember if I initially heard about it in news stories, but we also got a report from the [U.S. EPA] National Response Center. If the accident had happened in the United States, we would have mobilized a team immediately at the site.
The fact that it happened in Canada, we communicated with our counterparts at Transport Canada and the dangerous goods [officials] there. We stayed in very frequent communication with them. We also spent a lot of time talking with PHMSA, as they promulgate all hazardous materials regulations in the United States, while we [the FRA] do the majority of the enforcement. I also had frequent communication with the Transportation Board of Canada’s investigative folks.
As the investigation progressed, we were able to coordinate with Transport Canada and go up to evaluate the tank cars to see how they fared in that event. There was a lot of good collaboration.
RailPrime The National Transportation Safety Board issued some early recommendations shortly after the Lac-Megantic derailment occurred. What early recommendations came from the FRA as more information was learned about it?
Alexy: As information started coming out about the way the engineer left that train unsecured on the hill, we began to look at what we could do. One of the things we looked at was an [emergency order] on the securement of trains, because that’s what really happened in Lac-Megantic: That train wasn’t secured. So, that advisory was one of the first things we did, and it eventually got incorporated into our regulations.
You may remember, over a couple of years around the time of Lac-Megantic, there had been a whole series of derailments involving large quantities of flammable liquids; Lac-Megantic being the worst of them all. But that event put the exclamation point on the sentence that said moving large quantities of flammable liquids was dangerous. So, we started looking at the tank cars that were being used. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) had started to develop standards for tank cars for flammable liquids that were a little bit more robust than the DOT-111 tank cars [which were the type used in the Lac-Megantic case].
RailPrime Once the Lac-Megantic investigation was finished, what were the key regulations or recommendations resulting from it?
Alexy: The regulation for the designation of high-hazard flammable trains to high-hazard flammable unit trains. That designation changed a few things: They had to do a route-risk assessment, follow speed restrictions and notifications to the state emergency response centers were required. All of that was a big deal. The difference between a high-hazard flammable train and a high-hazard flammable unit train is the HHFT is 20 cars in a block or 35 cars loaded with a flammable liquid throughout a train. A high-hazard flammable unit train is anything of 70 cars or more loaded with a flammable liquid.
There also was a rule for the unit trains that required pneumatically controlled brakes. But after a new administration came in [at the FRA], they required a cost benefit analysis of that requirement. We did that, and based on that analysis, the costs outweighed the benefits. So, the pneumatically controlled brake requirement had to be pulled out of the regulations.
And then we developed a specification for tank cars that can be used to haul flammable liquids — the DOT-117 — and there was a phase-in for those. We’re still in the midst of the phaseout of [the older tank cars]. Years later came the securement of equipment rule.
RailPrime Do you think freight-rail transportation of high-hazard flammable materials is safer today as a result of the rule and regulation changes made?
Alexy: Yes, the equipment securement rule has been effective. And the tank cars: If you look at the performance of the DOT-117 involved in accidents, there is a clear improvement in the DOT-117's survivability and its ability to contain the commodity when it derails.
RailPrime Following the train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, earlier this year, some media reports have questioned whether the safety of rail transportation of hazardous flammable materials has improved since Lac-Megantic. How would you respond to such comments?
Alexy: I have not heard there have been comparisons of East Palestine to Lac-Megantic. There is no comparison. At Lac-Megantic, there were 47 people dead, and a town was decimated. While East Palestine was tragic, there were no fatalities. There is an environmental problem [in East Palestine] and they’re working through that, and there are some long-lasting problems. But if someone says, “Nothing has changed since Lac-Megantic,” I would disagree.
I think a lot has changed. We’ve discussed the rulemakings. But in general, if you look at the derailments involving flammable liquids, we’re not seeing them like we did before or around the time of Lac-Megantic.
RailPrime Do you think that’s primarily due to the regulatory changes put in place in the United States and Canada since then?
Alexy: I think when you look at the cause of derailments, Lac-Megantic was unique in that the train wasn’t secured, it rolled downhill and hit a curve it couldn’t negotiate. But when you look across the United States, the [other] incidents that were happening at the time were mostly due to broken rail. So, the industry has taken steps to ensure that their infrastructure is in good shape. There has been that kind of improvement. I think those types of things have helped improve safety as well.
Everybody knew that derailments happen and those involving large units of flammable liquid are bad. But what Lac-Megantic did was demonstrate the true risk, so it really raised awareness and the industry stepped up to make sure those types of things don’t happen anymore.
RailPrime: Is there anything else you’d like to say about Lac-Megantic's impact on rail safety in the United States?
Alexy: The one thing I wonder about is if it had happened in the United States, would the [public] reaction have been different. Because it happened in Canada, people [in the United States] were aware of it and understood the risk. But the same level of outrage that we saw after the East Palestine derailment — I don’t recall seeing that with Lac-Megantic. …
The incidents leading up to East Palestine had to do with the mechanical element of the hopper car that derailed, the wayside detector system and the process the railroad used to process those alarms that come in [to the crew]. Right now, the FRA is looking at what we should do with wayside detectors because they’re not now regulated.
This is unplowed ground for us, as far as regulations go. This isn’t a matter of improving regulations, it’s a matter of potentially evaluating whether we need regulations for wayside detectors.
RailPrime Where is the FRA in the process of determining whether regulation of wayside detectors is necessary?
Alexy: We’ve done an approved risk statement with the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee — that is one of the working groups that will be taking that [issue] up. We’ll be working collaboratively with railroads, suppliers and rail labor to figure out what is the best path forward.
